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The research for the operational volumes of the official history 
of the Canadian Army in the Second 
World War was gathered by two 
under-staffed and over-worked field 
historical units. They were organized 
and trained by Lieutenant-Colonel 
C.P. Stacey, the official historian of 
the overseas army, who was based 
at Canadian Military Headquarters 
in London. Stacey exercised close 
direction over the units through 
liaison visits, messages and frequent 
letters. The mission of the 1st Canadian 
Field Historical Section (1 CFHS), 
which served in Italy from November 
1943 to February 1945, was to gather 
“top-down” documents for the 
official record. Closer examination 
of their work shows that 1 CFHS 
was also recording a “worm’s eye” 
view of the war through art and the 
pages of the historians’ war diaries. 
In doing so, field historians Captain 
Eric Harrison and Captain Sam H. 
Hughes developed valuable analyses 
of Canadian military operations. 
Secondarily, they made a valuable 
contribution to our understanding 
of civil affairs in Italy, and the social 
history of the “D-Day Dodgers.”
 Stacey arrived in London at 
the end of 1940 with a mandate to 
document the Canadian Army’s 
overseas war. He was the right man 
for the job. A professor at Princeton 
University, a former officer in the 
Canadian militia, and one of only two 
Canadian university historians who 
specialized in military history, Stacey 
was prolific and committed. Still 
the job became too big for one man, 
no matter how industrious, as the 
overseas force grew by 1942 into the 
First Canadian Army comprising two 
corps with a total of five divisions.1 
Even so, Stacey had a difficult time 
persuading his superiors that a 
second historian was needed. For 
a time it appeared that Gerald S. 
Graham, of Queen’s University, 
whose recent work had taken him 
into naval and military history, might 
be available, but he joined the navy. 
George Stanley, the only Canadian 
historian other than Stacey to have 
focussed on military history in his 
graduate studies and publications, 
initially refused Stacey’s invitation, 
but then later accepted. Stanley, who 
was serving in an infantry battalion 
in Canada when Stacey contacted 
him, was a graduate of Oxford 
University, and in civilian life had 
been a professor of history at Mount 
Allison University.2 Stanley finally 
arrived in London only in October 
1942. 
 Canadian troops had stood on 
guard in England, a vital role in 
1940 and the first part of 1941 when 
a German invasion had been a real 
possibility. Thereafter the Canadians’ 
main purpose had been to prepare 
for an Allied return to Europe, but 
strategic circumstances repeatedly 
delayed that major operation. When, 
in August 1942 a large Canadian 
force built around the 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division (CID) carried out 
a raid on the French port of Dieppe, 
Stacey learned the hard way that 
when Canadian units went into 
action historians needed to go with 
them. Stacey was not warned of the 
raid and was on leave in August – his 
first holiday in the nearly two years 
he had been at CMHQ, London. The 
Dieppe operation was an unmitigated 
debacle that cost the 2nd CID 3,367 
casualties. Stacey scrambled to 
collect all of the information that he 
Abstract: The “top-down” official 
record of Canada in the Italian 
Campaign of the Second World War 
was gathered by the 1st Canadian 
Field Historical Section (1 CFHS), 
which served in Italy from 1943 to 
1945. Close study of 1 CFHS records 
indicates that it was also documenting 
a “worm’s eye” view of the campaign 
through a war art program and in the 
historians’ war diaries. Historians 
Captain Eric Harrison and Captain 
Sam H.S. Hughes offered preliminary 
analyses on important campaign 
questions, and, along with war 
artists Captain Charles Comfort and 
Lieutenant Lawren P. Harris, provided 
material for future scholarship on the 
social history of Canada in the Italian 
campaign.
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8could including first-hand accounts 
from Canadian officers and soldiers 
who returned to England. Such an 
after-the-fact effort involved many 
compromises, and the lessons were 
not lost on Stacey. He had to have 
advanced notice of future operations, 
and historians had to be attached to 
formations in the field so they could 
immediately gather and collate 
documents, and interview officers as 
soon as possible after combat actions 
before the passage of time blurred 
memories.3 
 There was precedent for this 
work. During the First World War, the 
ambitious Canadian businessman, 
member of the British Parliament, and 
socialite, Max Aitken, was Canada’s 
“Eye Witness” of the war. As self-
appointed historian of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, Aitken travelled 
behind the front interviewing soldiers 
for accounts he rushed into print in 
newspapers to promote the Canadian 
effort. He drew on this material to 
publish one of the first monographs 
about Canada’s part in the war effort, 
Canada in Flanders, which became an 
instant best seller when it appeared 
in 1916.4
 During the Second World War, 
the Americans also employed field 
historians. The idea originated with 
the Harvard maritime historian 
Samuel Eliot Morison, the Pulitzer 
Prize-winning author of a book 
about Christopher Columbus.5 To 
better appreciate the difficulties of 
Columbus’s voyage, Morison sailed 
the explorer’s route across the Atlantic 
Ocean. In 1942 he pitched the same 
concept to the United States Navy, 
arguing that he could write a better 
history of the war if he went to sea.6 
After lobbying President Roosevelt, 
who was a vocal proponent of a 
comprehensive history, Morison set 
sail. Ultimately his work was essential 
in convincing the US Army Historical 
Branch that battle reports, war dairies 
and message logs inadequately 
depicted what happened on the 
battlefield.7 Trained historians were 
made “combat historians” and sent 
overseas to interview rank and file 
soldiers. These interviews featured 
prominently in the American Forces 
in Action pamphlet series that began 
publication in 1943. The initiative 
for the series had come directly 
from General George C. Marshall, 
chief of staff of the US Army, who 
particularly wanted to have the 
pamphlets distributed in military 
hospitals “to help [wounded soldiers] 
understand why their sacrifices were 
necessary.”8 
 The British, according to Stacey, 
“scorned” the idea of placing 
historians in the field to conduct 
interviews. Instead, they preferred 
to keep their historical work in the 
Cabinet Office, relying on war diaries 
to construct the chronology. They did, 
however, coordinate a widespread 
effort to gather documents for 
archival keeping, and made extensive 
preparations for their official history 
while the war was still on.9 
 S t a c e y  d i d  n o t  h a ve  t h e 
manpower to employ “combat 
historians” the way the Americans 
did, but in October 1942 the Canadian 
Army agreed that one historical 
officer should be attached to each 
headquarters in the field. Stacey had 
hoped to send Sam H.S. Hughes 
to gather documents and conduct 
interviews with 1st Division when 
Colonel C.P. Stacey, the official historian 
of the overseas Canadian army, was 
responsible for setting up the field 
historical sections. He exercised close 
direction over the units through liaison 
visits, messages and frequent letters.
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9it participated in the Allied invasion 
of Sicily in July 1943. Hughes, the 
grandson of the infamous First 
World War minister of militia, Sir 
Sam Hughes, was an Oxford-trained 
historian in modern European 
history. When the war broke out in 
1939, Hughes was embarking on a 
law career at Osgoode Hall. He joined 
the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps 
and later the Queen’s Own Rifles, and, 
after completing two of three years 
of law school, the future Ontario 
Supreme Court judge went overseas. 
In June 1942, he was appointed 
to Operations and Intelligence at 
CMHQ, in an office located next 
door to Stacey. Upon finding out 
that the Canadians were to be sent 
to the Mediterranean theatre, Stacey 
asked Hughes if would like the job as 
historical officer. Although Hughes 
immediately agreed, it was not to 
be.10 Instead, the job went to Captain 
A.T. Sesia, an intelligence officer in 
1st Division. The idea of giving an 
historian – an outsider to the family 
of the combat formation’s staff –
extraordinary access to the inner 
sanctum of planning, administration 
and operations was a new concept, 
and clearly the division’s general 
staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
George Kitching, preferred that such 
a sensitive mission should be carried 
out by one of his own officers. With 
Sesia went war artist Lieutenant Will 
Ogilvie, recruited by Canadian High 
Commissioner Vincent Massey, who 
since 1939 had pressed tirelessly 
for an art program, inspired by 
the one set up by Beaverbrook in 
the First World War, to record the 
Canadian effort. With the help and 
support of Stacey, Massey established 
a formal army art program that 
was administered by the historical 
section.11 
 Although not a trained historian, 
Sesia proved effective in recording 
1st Division’s operations in Sicily in 
July-August 1943, and his efforts have 
been well documented elsewhere.12 
Most importantly, Sesia was an 
ambassador for the historical section 
among 1st Division officers. At the 
same time he was able to provide 
information and advice from which 
Stacey “codified” a set of instructions 
to “clarify things generally” and 
assist future field historians “in 
[their] relationships both with 
formation headquarters and with 
other historical officers in the theatre, 
whose work [they had] the task of co-
ordinating.”13 The efforts of Ogilvie 
later prompted Stacey to write, “I 
know of no other pictorial record of a 
campaign anywhere to match the one 
Ogilvie made in Sicily.”14 Sesia and 
Ogilvie had done important work.
 By the end of  the Sici l ian 
campaign, the Allies decided that 
they would maintain pressure on 
the Germans retreating to Italy, by 
crossing the straits of Messina and 
assaulting the beaches at Salerno 
in September. In Italy, at places 
like Ortona and the Hitler Line, 
the Canadians waged some of their 
toughest battles of the war.
 Two months into the campaign 
the Canadian presence in Italy 
expanded, with the dispatch from the 
United Kingdom of I Canadian Corps 
headquarters and 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division (CAD). The size 
of the field historical section grew 
accordingly. Eric Harrison was sent 
to Italy in command of 1 CFHS which 
was responsible for documenting 
the actions of I Corps. Harrison 
was a history professor at Queen’s 
University, and he was not a military 
historian.15 Like Sam Hughes and 
most Canadian historians of the day, 
they studied constitutional, economic 
and social political history.16
 In autumn 1943, having earned 
much-needed respect for the field 
historians among the combat 
formations, Sesia was relieved by 
Hughes, who, under Harrison’s 
command, took over the responsibility 
for gathering documents from 1st 
Division. Ogilvie had come down 
with malaria in Sicily, so he was 
relieved by Captain Charles Comfort, 
an art history professor from Toronto. 
Comfort was joined by Lieutenant 
Lawren P. Harris, son of the Group 
Right: Captain A.T. Sesia (left, shown 
here visiting Mount Vesuvius with a 
guide and Private Heaton) was the first 
historian assigned to First Canadian 
Infantry Division for the Sicilian 
Campaign.
Far right: Captain S.H.S. Hughes by 
Charles Comfort. Hughes was Stacey’s 
first choice to accompany 1st Division to 
Sicily. Hughes did take over from Sesia 
when the fighting moved to the Italian 
mainland. 
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of Seven painter and a noted artist in 
his own right. 
 Assembling comprehensive “top-
down” documentation of the war was 
the historians’ primary objective in 
Italy. In an era when historical practice 
was still profoundly influenced by 
Leopold von Ranke’s “scientific” 
approach,  th is  meant  paying 
assiduous attention to “the facts.” 
Stacey directed 1 CFHS to get “the 
raw material clearly and accurately 
on paper, send it to [CMHQ],” where 
the final job of writing narratives 
would be done.17 Arguably their most 
important, and certainly their most 
frustrating assignment was to oversee 
the writing of war diaries by unit 
intelligence officers, most of whom 
were utterly unschooled in historical 
practices. They were also instructed to 
collect communications from among 
Canadian units, and with higher level 
British and Allied headquarters in 
Italy, so that historians would be able 
to contextualize Canadian operations. 
Finally, these records were to be 
supplemented by interviews with 
Canadian officers.18
 Although the ultimate purpose 
was to provide material for the 
published official histories of the 
army, there were immediate needs. 
Operational lessons documented 
by the field historians were collated 
into “Extracts from War Diaries and 
Memoranda” by Stacey’s office in 
London and provided to Canadian 
units training for the eventual assault 
on Northwest Europe.19 Stacey also 
drew on the whole body of his 
correspondence with Harrison and 
the latter’s reports so that the 2nd 
Canadian Field Historical Section 
that would accompany the Canadians 
to France would to benefit from the 
experiences in Italy. 
 Tim Cook, in Clio’s Warriors, 
observed that “these historians 
[were] essentially schooled to place 
value on ‘great men and great events’ 
rather than in social history from 
the ground up, it is unfortunate, 
if understandable, that a valuable 
William Abernathy Ogilvie – Company Headquarters, 1943.
Ogilvie’s paintings in Sicily as the official war artist prompted C.P. Stacey to write: “I know of no other 
pictorial record of a campaign anywhere to match the one Ogilvie made in Sicily.”
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opportunity was lost in failing to 
record the private’s view of the 
war.”20 It was as much a practical as a 
philosophical issue, as the systematic, 
large-scale recording necessary to 
capture soldiers’ perspectives was 
far beyond the limited resources 
available to Stacey. 
 Yet, Stacey and 1 CFHS did 
not ignore the view from the slit-
trench in favour of the perspective 
from headquarters. One of the 
fundamental  purposes  –  and 
achievements – of the war art program 
was to capture the experience of the 
front lines. As Harrison later put 
it “Comfort’s mission… [was] as a 
soldiering artist.”21 Since the artists 
were contributing to the historical 
record, they were subject to the same 
standards of precision and accuracy 
that Stacey applied to Harrison 
and Hughes. The ever-watchful 
history chief, for example, advised 
Comfort and Harris’ successors in 
Italy, MacDonald and Tinning, to 
reconsider their subject matter, as he 
felt they put too much emphasis on 
landscape scenes and not enough on 
Canadian troops. Without exposing 
themselves to much danger, they 
somehow needed to get closer to 
operational subjects.22 
 Comfort, in Harrison’s view, set 
the standard for war art. “He [was] 
acutely aware of both the immediate 
and the long-term importance of 
the work he [was] doing and [was] 
therefore the more concerned with 
the fact that his production [had] 
been cut down by about half as a 
Top: Charles Comfort – Via Dolorosa. 
Eric McGeer commented that this 
painting of “the road of sorrows” is a 
“hellish depiction of the fighting and 
remains the defining image of the Battle 
of Ortona.”
Right: Charles Comfort working on a 
painting in Italy, March 1944.
Far right: Lawren P. Harris paints beside 
the wreckage of a German PzKpfW IV 
tank, Italy, March 1944.
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result of the conditions under which 
it [had] to be carried on.”23 The 
winter months were cold and rainy –
conditions not particularly conducive 
to sketching, watercolour or oil 
paintings. Yet, Comfort persevered 
to paint with “complete objectivity,” 
projecting onto the canvas “what he 
[saw], directly, without elaboration, 
and, as it were, without comment.” 
In December 1943, he even followed 
on the heels of the 2nd Brigade as it 
waged a bloody battle to push the 
1st German Parachute Division from 
Ortona, the easternmost anchor on 
the Germans’ winter defensive line. 
Comfort sketched the scene before 
the battle had completely ended, 
an initiative that Harrison strongly 
commended “from the historian’s 
point of view.”24 
 Through the war art program, 
the historical section created a history 
of the campaign that did more 
than complement and supplement 
the written, photographic and 
cartographic record.25 Massey and 
Stacey were determined to display 
the works as quickly as possible, 
and made considerable efforts to 
mount exhibitions in England and in 
Canada during and immediately after 
the war. While there was certainly a 
propaganda element to these shows, 
Stacey’s primary purpose was to 
bring out the “personal history”26 
of the Canadian Army’s effort, 
something quite different from the 
top-down record of policy, training 
and operations whose construction 
was the historians’ primary mission. 
The art was consciously directed 
toward an audience much broader 
than those who would be most 
interested in the documentary record. 
 At the same time, Stacey made 
further efforts to capture a wider 
picture of the war by having the 
field historians record their own 
observations for inclusion in the 
1 CFHS war diary. Each historian, 
Stacey directed, should provide “a 
useful commentary upon which 
he himself sees of the campaign.”27 
Harrison in particular recorded more 
than his daily administrative duties, 
and captured the sights, sounds and 
smells of living and working in a 
war zone. He included reports of 
interviews he undertook informally 
with rank and file soldiers. The 
thoroughness of Harrison’s diary in 
part reflected the fact that, unlike 
many of the staff officers whom he 
trained to write operational war 
diaries – a task he once referred to 
as “missionary work among the 
heathen” – he was comfortable 
with the pen.28 Yet he and Hughes 
also repeatedly proved aware that 
they were establishing an entire 
field of history for generations of 
historians, not just laying the ground 
work for an operational official 
history, by documenting a history 
of the campaign that went beyond 
Members of the 1st Canadian Field 
Historical Section set up a camp in 
Italy next to their Humber. From left to 
right: Captain Charles Comfort, Private 
Heaton, Lieutenant William Ogilvie and 
Captain A.T. Sesia.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stacey poses with 
members of his staff in England: from 
left to right: William Ogilvie, O.N. Fisher, 
Captain Heathcote, L. Wrinch, Stacey, 
Lieutenant Engler, Major A.T. Sesia, G.C. 
Pepper, Captain G.R. Martin
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the movements of companies and 
battalions. Indeed, three themes 
are prominent in the historians’ 
diaries: the fate of Italian towns and 
countryside, the attitudes of Italian 
citizens and their interactions with 
the Allies, and impressions of the 
daily lives of Canadian soldiers in the 
front lines. 
 The beating taken by Italian cities 
and the squalid living conditions that 
resulted for the inhabitants never 
ceased to move Harrison. Upon 
reaching Catania on 11 November 
1943, he observed the heavy toll of 
the Allied bombardment, particularly 
on the waterfront buildings, and 
the “pervasive dirt and stink.” 
Inflated prices and food shortages 
plagued hungry Italians because 
of the “successive occupations by 
the Germans and the British having 
apparently greatly diminished stocks 
which under conditions could not 
be replenished.”29 Particularly 
wrenching was the fate of the Roman 
Basilica in Rocca, which he saw in 
February 1944: 
The church and the cloisters had 
been hit by gun-fire, but the gaunt 
structure itself remained, still a 
landmark above the ADRIATIC and 
the valley of the SANGRO, as it had 
been since its foundation in the 8th 
century. In the crypt were frescoes 
with figures done in the transitional 
manner of Cimabue: their early-
renaissance faces looked down with 
faint surprise on the soldiers of 5 
[CAD]…who were using the crypt 
as their mess.30
Stil l  grimmer were Harrison’s 
descriptions of Monte Cassino, 
which he visited in mid-May, a month 
after it was levelled by American 
bombers. He was again mesmerized 
by the total destruction of the ancient 
architecture, although the human toll 
captured his attention just as strongly. 
“Unburied corpses, their limbs 
fantastically deployed, still lay where 
they had fallen, looking like waxen 
dummies, dusty, bloated, exuding 
aft, their necks lolling, their hair like 
dried-out grass, their features gray, 
remote, unhuman.”31 Harrison’s 
poignant descriptions of the carnage 
of war were perhaps cathartic for 
him, and he certainly understood this 
part of his reporting as being essential 
for future historians. 
 H a r r i s o n  wa s  e s p e c i a l l y 
interested in the perceptions of the 
Italian population – Hitler’s erstwhile 
allies – and the picture that he 
painted was complex. For example, 
the residents of Taormina, whom 
Harrison interviewed in his first few 
days in Sicily, steadfastly blamed 
American bombers for the damage 
done to their town, maintaining that 
the British planes had flown low 
enough to pinpoint targets. Harrison 
Refugees returning to the ruins of Ortona after the battle, January 1944.
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recorded that he “had heard the 
same story from other parts of Sicily. 
Whether it is an accurate version of 
what took place or merely Sicilian tact 
is a moot point.”32 
 The citizens of Rome were more 
appreciative of the Allies’ efforts, 
having spent nearly a year under 
Nazi occupation after the capitulation 
of Benito Mussolini in July 1943. 
Harrison arrived in Rome on 7 June 
1944, just days after its liberation by 
the US Fifth Army. “The city had not 
yet recovered from the enthusiasm 
and emotion...the people thronged 
the streets smiled and waved.” 
In the midst of their jubilation, 
however, “it was observed that 
they had not yet had time to take 
down the anti-British and American 
posters from their walls.” One poster 
showed bombs marked “Made in 
USA” plummeting towards cowering 
women and children; it read: “These 
are the Liberators.”33 
 Allied opinions of the Italians were 
more consistent. In December 1943, 
Harrison spent time with the 
Allied Military Government 
(AMG), which had the role of 
administering Italian towns 
and re-establishing order 
once the Germans had been 
driven out. After witnessing 
a Canadian major requisition 
an apartment  house  in 
Avellino, leaving the town’s 
podesta (mayor) to find 
alternate accommodations for 
380 locals, he reflected that, 
“one element in the problem 
of dealing with the Italian 
civil population was that they 
did not regard themselves 
as a conquered people and 
expected rather to have things 
done for them than to have 
demands made upon them.”34 This 
statement, of course, says as much 
about Harrison as it does about the 
Italians. 
 Harrison was sometimes placed 
in the awkward position of recording 
the absurd for posterity. In May 
1944, for example, he spoke with 
an AMG officer who had dealt with 
seven cases of rape in one day, and 
believed that the majority were not 
committed by Canadians, but rather 
by Germans who had crossed into the 
Canadian area incognito. Harrison 
neither confirmed nor denied this 
unlikely allegation, evidence that 
he understood his observations 
were potentially sensitive. However, 
while Harrison kept silent about his 
own conclusions, he recorded the 
officer’s opinion for future historical 
research.35 
 D e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  I t a l i a n 
populat ion was an important 
challenge that affected operational 
efficiency and effectiveness. Another 
was the condition of the country’s 
infrastructure, whose appalling 
weaknesses were exacerbated by war. 
Combat often left roads impassable. 
After the Battle for the Moro, the road 
from San Leonardo was littered with 
“trackless, turretless [tanks],” rusted 
out anti-tank guns, and dismembered 
Shermans.36 Simply moving about the 
country was often an ordeal. On 21 
January 1944 Harrison remarked that 
he had “obtained a pretty clear idea 
of the extraordinary difficulties of 
maintaining road [communications].” 
Not only did engineers regularly 
have to widen roads, but they had to 
clear them of mines for safe travel. 
Harrison let the sappers do the 
talking for him when he copied down 
the verse written on three signs en 
route to Rocca: “Wanted Combined 
[Operations] on the Roads – Combine 
with the Sappers – We Can Build 
the Bridges if you can Look after the 
Roads.”37 R.T. Currelly, who joined 
Harrison’s staff as historical officer 
of 5th Canadian Armoured Division, 
noted in August 1944 that soldiers 
learned to deal with bad roads just 
as they did many other aspects of the 
war: 
In all this filth, fatigue and bodily 
discomfort the same old time-worn 
humour and perpetual good nature 
persist. Someone’s truck slips on 
a soft shoulder and rolls over. The 
driver is sitting dejectedly in the 
burning dust waiting, perhaps 
hours, for a Recovery Lorry. Nearly 
everyone who passes has something 
to shout, such as “Wotcha thinkin’ 
about Jock?,” or “That’s a stooped 
place to park!38 
 For Harrison and Currelly, the 
effect of Italian roads on soldiers’ 
experiences was as interesting and 
worthy of note as was its influence 
on the conduct of operations. 
 To be sure, the historians were 
primarily interested in how the 
Canadians conducted operations 
and documenting this was their 
Er ic  Harr ison,  a  h is tor y 
professor at Queen’s University, 
took command of 1 CFHS when 
1st Canadian Corps became 
operational in Italy. 
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core purpose. Since the end of the 
war, historians have debated the 
effectiveness of the Eighth Army’s 
rigid artillery-based doctrine in Italy. 
“The price paid for an overwhelming 
emphasis on firepower was to 
restrict the other half of the fire 
and movement equation,” wrote 
William McAndrew in 1987. Instead 
of heeding Sun Tzu and “flowing 
along paths of least resistance,” 
the Canadians’ emphasis on rigid 
artillery plans minimized their ability 
to exploit unexpected opportunities.39 
The field historians keyed in on this 
issue as it was debated in the field. 
Both General H.D.G. Crerar and 
his successor as corps commander, 
General E.L.M. Burns, believed 
detailed preparations were necessary 
before any assault on dug-in German 
defensive positions. “It is a matter for 
the record,” Harrison wrote, “that the 
Corps [Commander] belonged to that 
school of thought which preferred 
thoroughness and deliberation to 
the impetuousness which might 
well have met with reverses at the 
outset of this first commitment of 
the [Canadian] Corps to an offensive 
battle.”40 
 Others, like Lord Tweedsmuir, 
the officer who led the Hastings and 
Prince Edward Regiment up the back-
side of a Sicilian cliff to capture the 
town of Assoro by stealth, lectured 
that “great reliance had…to be placed 
upon improvisation.”41 Harrison 
tended to agree with corps command. 
For example, on the assault on the 
Hitler Line in May 1944, Harrison 
reported that “when the tension 
broke and at the appointed [hour] 
the barrage came screaming down, it 
was evident that the deliberation with 
which the assault had been prepared 
would assuredly confirm the victory 
with a minimum loss of life.”42 The 
attention that Harrison devotes in 
his war diary to infrastructure and 
terrain suggests that his analysis was 
formed, at least in part, by having 
seen too closely the obstacles (man-
made and natural) that restricted 
Canadian trucks drive through the battered town 
of Pontecorvo, Italy during the Hitler Line advance 
Hitler Line, 24 May 1944. 
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movement, including blown-bridges, 
steep roads, vineyards, orchards, 
stream networks, mountain ranges, 
narrow valleys, and the ubiquitous 
and capricious German 88s. 
 Harrison and Hughes believed 
that “success” needed to be measured 
not by the achievement of a breakout 
– which never came – but by the 
attrition of the enemy. In one report, 
Hughes suggested it was laudable 
that in the drudging months spent 
pushing the Germans from their 
“Winter Line” through Ortona 
towards Pescara, “a heavy toll had 
been exacted from the obstinate 
enemy.”43 This was not to say that 
the historians were unaware when 
operations fell short. For instance, 
Harrison recorded in March that 
“the front was strangely quiet…A 
posture of defence had been assumed 
and the verdict registered of a winter 
campaign which had failed to achieve 
its objectives.”44 Nevertheless, the 
historians concluded that over the 
winter the Germans had been hit 
hard, thrown back and were then 
scrambling to save their defences at 
Cassino.
 The emphasis on destruction 
of enemy forces was apparent in 
Harrison’s discussion in his war diary 
of the US Fifth Army’s liberation of 
Rome, and word, two days later on 6 
June 1944, that the Allies had landed 
in Normandy. 
The news [about the Normandy 
landings ]  was  gree ted  wi th 
enthusiasm, but not without a hint 
of regret that 1 [Canadian] Corps 
Canadian troops enter the village of San Pancrazio, Italy where the previous week German soldiers had massacred the 
male inhabitants. The “D-Day Dodgers” fought a gruelling, attritional campaign in Italy where they served in the shadow 
of events in Northwest Europe, but they were well served by efforts of 1st Canadian Field Historical Section to record their 
accomplishments.
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was no longer in the battle. For 
although the capture of Rome had 
not been the primary objective of 
the offensive…its liberation could 
not but be regarded as a triumphant 
climax to the dusty battles of the Liri 
valley.45
 While the glory of capturing 
the capital would have been a well-
earned honour, Harrison believed 
that “the front was too narrow for 
both the Fifth and British Eighth 
Armies to converge upon a point of 
small tactical importance.”46 Rome 
was not the main objective – the 
destruction of the German Army in 
Italy was.
 The slow slogging of attrition 
had little glory for the men involved. 
Stacey, while in Italy on a liaison visit 
in March 1944, remarked: 
It may be noted at this point 
that our observation was that in 
general the Canadian troops do not 
like Italy. Complaints of the dirt 
and squalor of the country were 
universal; and it was obvious that an 
unusually severe winter had been a 
particularly unpleasant introduction 
to the country. There is also some 
feeling that the Italian campaign is a 
“sideshow” by comparison with the 
operations on the United Kingdom, 
projected for North-West Europe. 
Several officers remarked that it 
was unfortunate that the Canadian 
Army should be divided between 
two theatres of war instead of acting 
as a united force. There appeared to 
be a very general envy of the troops 
preparing for action in England, 
and there was widespread interest, 
evidenced by many questions, in 
the prospect of the “Second Front.” 
Nevertheless, the Canadian Troops 
in Italy were, in general, obviously 
in good heart, and were looking 
forward to further action.47
 Charles Comfort noted a similar 
sentiment when he wrote in his 
memoirs that shortly after the Battle 
of Ortona a rumour swept through 
1 CID that they were being moved 
back to England in March.48 The 
rumour was unfounded and perhaps 
just wishful thinking on the part of 
battalion commanders, fatigued from 
pushing their troops through the 
inhospitable Italian peaks and gullies, 
and incurring heavy casualties for no 
apparent war-winning reason. 
 Soldiers fighting in Italy knew 
that they were fighting in a secondary 
theatre, while the “real war” was 
fought in Northwest Europe, and 
this opinion was duly recorded by 
the field historians. By documenting 
this perception among soldiers, the 
field historians made an important 
contribution to the interpretive 
framework that has dominated the 
study of the Italian theatre for the past 
60 years. Nowhere is this interpretive 
framework more apparent than in 
the final pages of From Pachino to 
Ortona, the preliminary account of 
the Italian campaign published in 
1946. In the conclusion, Stacey and 
Hughes found it hard to explain 
why the Canadians were in theatre. 
The Canadian formations, however, 
did have the honour of being among 
the Allied forces that first breached 
Fortress Europa, and could be proud 
of their association with the renowned 
Eighth Army and its leader General 
Bernard Montgomery. The Canadians 
who survived from “the Sicilian hills 
swimming in the August heat to the 
icy, shell-churned mud above the 
Moro,” could rest assured that, as the 
final line of the book declares, their 
experiences were an inspiration to the 
tens of thousands of other Canadians 
poised to cross the Channel.49 It was a 
fitting tribute to the D-Day Dodgers.
 Stacey went to extraordinary 
lengths to make certain that a 
balanced and comprehensive record 
of the Canadian Army’s effort in the 
Second World War was kept. He 
did this by ensuring that the officers 
of No.1 Field Historical Section 
understood and endeavoured to 
meet those standards. Certainly, 
as Harrison wrote in 1948, their 
assignment to carry out research 
in such depth reflected well on 
the army: “in such a context of 
success or failure, the admission of 
the historian as eye-witness, cross-
examiner, and custodian of the 
evidence, asserts a confident will to 
submit to trial by history.”50 The “top-
down” documentation, including 
interviews with key commanders 
and staff officers, gathered by the 
field historians as their primary 
mission recorded decision-making 
before, during, and after actions. 
In their preliminary comments on 
this material, the field historians 
made important interpretations of 
the Italian campaign, on specific 
matters such as British and Canadian 
attack doctrine, and on such broader 
questions as the measures of success 
in hard-fought battles of attrition. At 
the same time, the work of the artists, 
and the observations recorded by 
the historians in their diaries, did 
much to capture experience “from 
the ground,” providing material 
for future scholarship in new fields 
of study on the social and cultural 
dimensions of the war. 
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